Future Population and Human Capital in Heterogeneous India by K.C., S. et al.
Future population and human capital in
heterogeneous India
Samir KCa,b,1, Marcus Wurzerb, Markus Speringerb, and Wolfgang Lutzb,1
aAsian Demographic Research Institute, Shanghai University, Shanghai, 200444, China; and bWittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human
Capital (IIASA, VID/OeAW, WU), International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, 2361, Austria
Contributed by Wolfgang Lutz, June 27, 2018 (sent for review January 31, 2018; reviewed by Josh Goldstein and K. S. James)
Within the next decade India is expected to surpass China as the
world’s most populous country due to still higher fertility and a
younger population. Around 2025 each country will be home to
around 1.5 billion people. India is demographically very heteroge-
neous with some rural illiterate populations still having more than
four children on average while educated urban women have fewer
than 1.5 children and with great differences between states. We
show that the population outlook greatly depends on the degree
to which this heterogeneity is explicitly incorporated into the pop-
ulation projection model used. The conventional projection model,
considering only the age and sex structures of the population at the
national level, results in a lower projected population than the same
model applied at the level of states because over time the high-
fertility states gain more weight, thus applying the higher rates to
more people. The opposite outcome results from an explicit consid-
eration of education differentials because over time the proportion
of more educated women with lower fertility increases, thus lead-
ing to lower predicted growth than in the conventional model. To
comprehensively address this issue, we develop a five-dimensional
model of India’s population by state, rural/urban place of residence,
age, sex, and level of education and show the impacts of different
degrees of aggregation. We also provide human capital scenarios
for all Indian states that suggest that India will rapidly catch up with
other more developed countries in Asia if the recent pace of educa-
tion expansion is maintained.
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At the time of independence in 1947, India’s total populationwas around 370 million and Indian women on average had
six children. The age structure was very young, and over 80% of
the population was illiterate (1). As a consequence, the pop-
ulation grew very rapidly, raising early concerns about the suf-
ficiency of food supply and development prospects in general.
Given these fears, in the late 1960s the Ford Foundation com-
missioned the “Second India” study to understand how India
would fare under an expected doubling of its population (hence
the name of the study) (2). In 1965 India’s population was 500
million, and shortly before 2000 it reached the 1 billion mark.
Revisiting the Second India around that time, Cassen found a
rather mixed record. Some issues such as food production turned
out to be better than feared, while others such as lack of edu-
cation and poverty were worse than hoped (2). Both authors
pointed at the great heterogeneity of the subcontinent, illus-
trated by the fertility rates in the early 1990s, which had already
declined to 1.8 children per woman in Kerala but still stood at 5.1
in Uttar Pradesh (3).
The great heterogeneity of the Indian population is also the
main focus of this paper. We will show how different ways of
explicitly addressing heterogeneity in our demographic models will
produce different outlooks for India’s future population, human
capital, and thus development. Fig. 1 shows the evolution of one
century of India’s population by level of education as observed
since 1970 and forecast under a model described in this paper. It
shows that in the 1970s still far more than half of the entire adult
population had never received any formal education and that this
unfavorable situation has changed only very slowly. Still, by 1990,
half of the adult population had never been to school.
Educational attainment of women has been much worse than
that of men. Fig. 2 shows the age and education pyramids for 1970
and 2015. It shows that in 1970 about three quarters of Indian
adult women had never been to school. Only a very tiny elite had
the privilege of education. Among the younger cohorts, the pro-
portion with at least primary education starts to slowly increase.
For males, education levels are remarkably higher with only fewer
than half of all adult men never having been to school. Because of
higher fertility levels—during the 1960s Indian women had on
average almost six children—the population age structure in 1970
was still extremely young. This very young age structure, together
with only slow declines in birth rates, resulted in an increase of
India’s population from 554 million in 1970 to 1.3 billion in 2015.
Today the younger cohorts are significantly better educated, but
the legacy of low levels of female education is still visible in the
low educational attainment of older cohorts, particularly of
women. In association with the improving education of younger
women, national-level fertility rates have also declined to 2.2,
which is just around a third of their levels in the 1960s.
In this paper we will address the likely future population
trends of India while systematically accounting for India’s great
population heterogeneity. Earlier projections of India that tried
to go beyond conventional aggregate projections by age and sex
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revealed an interesting phenomenon, namely that projections
turn out to be significantly higher or lower depending on what
additional sources of heterogeneity are taken into account. One
study (4) showed that, if the projection is carried out at the level
of India’s 35 states, then the sum of state projections turns out to
be significantly higher due to the fact that the high-fertility states
over time receive more weight, and thus the higher fertility rates
are applied to relatively more women. In contrast, projections
that differentiated by level of educational attainment (at the
national level) (5) resulted in lower forecasts because over time
the younger, more educated cohorts of women entered the main
reproductive ages, and since higher education is associated with
lower fertility, this led to lower overall fertility.
These seemingly contradictory results, which depend on which
source of evident population heterogeneity is included in the
model, lead to the more general methodological debate in
population forecasting and even more broadly for all social and
economic forecasting models. What is the most appropriate way
to account for the observable heterogeneity of agents in fore-
casts? While unobservable population heterogeneity also matters
(6), the options to account for it are limited, a fact that suggests
caution when interpreting results. Observed population hetero-
geneity, on the other hand, could readily be incorporated into
multidimensional models, but there has been an interesting de-
bate about whether this should always be done, most promi-
nently in a set of papers in 1995 on the question of whether
simple models outperform complex ones (7). This discussion
focused primarily on the question of whether forecasting total
population size directly by applying assumed growth rates has
given more accurate projections than the more complex cohort-
component methods projecting individual age cohorts. In this
context, Long (8) stresses that one needs to distinguish between
two different questions: (i) whether one is only interested in the
difference it makes for total population size forecasts and (ii)
whether the additional dimension considered is of interest in its
own right. We will add to this methodological discussion through
an ex ante analysis of the sensitivity of Indian population fore-
casts to different sources of heterogeneity in the context of a
multidimensional model, which, in addition to the conventional
age and sex structure, also explicitly differentiates by level of
educational attainment, urban/rural place of residence, and state
of residence with differential fertility and mortality rates.
Heterogeneous India
India is a subcontinent that includes many population groups
differing by language, ethnicity, religion, and caste (3). While
some of this heterogeneity is stratified spatially and can be
captured by differentiating between states and urban and rural
areas, other factors (such as caste) exist in almost every location.
Since statistical information tends to be collected along admin-
istrative boundaries, regional differentiation can be captured
more easily from official aggregate statistical sources. Some of
the other sources of heterogeneity can be derived only from
individual-level data or more detailed cross-tabulations of census
data. As has been argued earlier (9) and recently by Lutz and KC
(10), the level of educational attainment and urban/rural place of
residence are the two most important demographic dimensions
of population heterogeneity after age and sex that cover relevant
sociodemographic differentiations and should be used when
measuring and modeling population dynamics. Following this
approach, this study uses data that differentiate the populations
of each of the 35 Indian states by all four dimensions (age, sex,
level of education, and urban/rural place of residence).
The data used in this study come from detailed tabulations of
the two most recent Indian censuses that were conducted in 2001
and 2011. These census tabulations were complemented with
respect to vital rates by tabulations from the Sample Registration
Survey (SRS) with annual information for the years 1999–2013.
This allows us not only to study cross-sectional information, but
also to analyze the trends over time since 1999. A more detailed
specification of the data sources is given in SI Appendix.
Since fertility levels are the most important source of differ-
ential population growth, we studied the regional demographic
Fig. 1. India’s total population 1970–2070 by level of education (23).
Fig. 2. Age and education pyramids for India (national level) for 1970 and 2015 (23).
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heterogeneity first through the lens of fertility. The map of In-
dia’s 35 states and union territories according to their fertility
levels in 2010–2013 (Fig. 3) shows a distinct pattern of North–
South differences with some interesting exceptions. Fertility is
highest in the big states of the northwestern India—above three
children per woman in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pra-
desh, with Rajasthan and Jharkhand being very close to that
level. On the other end of the spectrum are eight small states and
union territories with fertility levels of less than 1.6. But even the
big southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu
are well below 2.0. As will be discussed below, these differences
to a large extent can be explained by different levels of social and
economic development, but there remain some relevant cultural
differences as well. Odisha is an example where, despite a low
level in terms of social and economic development, fertility level
has been relatively low due to extensive family planning drives in
some parts of India (3, 11).
Next, we look at the further stratification of fertility levels by
maternal education and urban/rural place of residence (Fig. 4).
Here we see a very consistent, almost linear, decline of fertility by
levels of education with only a slight reversal for the very highest
group. For rural fertility at the national level, total fertility rate
(TFR) is 3.2 for illiterate women, declines to 2.6 for those with
completed primary education, and bottoms at 1.7 for those with
completed secondary education. For urban women, the slope of
the gradient is about the same, but the level of the line is about half
a child lower, starting at 2.6 for illiterate women to 1.3 for women
with completed secondary education. While the line gives the na-
tional average, there clearly is some variation around these aver-
ages at the state level. The variation can be explained in terms of
social, economic, and cultural differences as well as varying levels
of success in family-planning drives among the poor and less ed-
ucated population at the state level (3, 11). In addition, the edu-
cation distribution within each education category could also be a
reason for the variation.
Illustrative Constant Rates Scenario
For analytically comparing the effect of different forms of aggre-
gation on project results, one must compare projections with
equivalent fertility, mortality, migration, and education assump-
tions. This raises problems for any kind of more realistic pro-
jection that assumes continued changes of these rates in the future
because the assumptions about these changes must be made for
some specific level of aggregation. If we want to make “identical”
assumptions at different levels of aggregation, then the easiest way
of doing so is to simply hold constant all of the currently observed
rates at all levels of aggregation. This freezing of transition rates at
their current level will result in differences that can be entirely
attributed to the effects of different levels of aggregation. The
resulting differences will be the consequence of projection “errors”
that result from assuming population homogeneity where actually
there is measurable heterogeneity. The result will also allow us to
understand which sources of heterogeneity, of the ones considered
here, are more relevant in influencing results. The findings of this
systematic comparison have important general implications for the
way in which population projections should be done in the future.
Fig. 5 shows the aggregate national TFR for India, resulting
from assuming constant fertility rates at different levels of aggre-
gation. Starting from the baseline TFR of slightly above 2.4, the
straight red horizontal line gives the national level TFR, which is
invariant when it is assumed to be constant at the national level
without considering heterogeneity. If fertility rates are held con-
stant at the level of the 35 states and union territories of India, then
TFR will increase almost linearly to close to 3.0 by the end of the
century because over time the high fertility states will see higher
population growth and thus their higher fertility level will gradually
carry more weight in determining the national fertility level.
However, when fertility rates are kept constant at the level of the
six different education groups without considering the state of
residence, then the national-level fertility declines sharply over the
coming two decades before leveling off. This is due to the educa-
tion momentum that is already embedded in the population
structure with the young cohorts of women being significantly
better educated than the average woman in reproductive age today.
These better-educated young cohorts will gradually move up the
age pyramid and hence lower the average fertility of reproductive-
age women. But this effect will be happening only over the next two
decades because in this scenario school enrollment rates are also
kept constant and the new cohorts entering school age will not see
any further improvements in education, which translates into no
further decline in fertility under this constant scenario.
These results show numerically the above-described issue,
which in part motivated this study. The two projections ac-
counting for different sources of heterogeneity (one by states,
the other by education) yielded deviations from the aggregate-
level projection that go in different directions. Fig. 5 also shows
that disaggregation by urban/rural place of residence goes in the
same direction as states, and thus considering both together,
yields the highest aggregate fertility. When combining education
and urban/rural place of residence that have effects in opposing
directions, then the education effect clearly dominates. The most
interesting case is to see what happens when state, place of
residence, and education effects (two working upward and one
working downward) are combined. Here, first the education
effect dominates and leads to lower fertility until aroundFig. 3. Map of Indian states. Color codes for TFR (24).
Fig. 4. Total fertility rates in India by place of residence and education of
the mother, distributions across states and territories (box shows 50% range,
lines span full range, and points are outliers) (24).
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2050, after which point the state and place of residence effects
dominate.
Fig. 6 shows the results of these different fertility levels together
with all other demographic rates held constant at the indicated
levels. The resulting population sizes by the end of the century
span a huge range from 1.6 billion in the case of stratifying only by
level of education to 3.1 billion in the case of stratifying only by
state and place of residence. Considering that these results (dif-
fering by 1.5 billion people) come from identical assumptions that
keep all demographic rates constant and vary only the source of
heterogeneity explicitly included in the model suggests the critical
importance of the question of which heterogeneity to include in
the model (discussed further in the concluding section).
A Multidimensional Medium Scenario for India
To come up with a realistic population scenario that incorporates
what is seen from today’s perspective as the most likely future
trajectories of fertility, mortality, migration, and education, we
conducted a very detailed analysis of education-specific trends in 70
territorial units of India (urban and rural for each of the 35 states
and union territories). Since full documentation of these specific
analyses is given elsewhere (12), here we summarize only the basic
findings and choices that went into defining the medium scenario.
To make the study comparable across demographic components,
similar methods were used to define the models generating the
assumptions for all 70 territorial units. Hence, we developed a
fertility model, a mortality model, a migration model, and an ed-
ucation model that will be briefly outlined in the following sections.
Fertility. In terms of the fertility model, a method was developed to
extend into the future the empirically given trends of age- and
education-specific fertility rates (by state and urban/rural) from the
period 1999–2013. General trends show that fertility has been de-
clining rapidly among women with no education or some primary
education, while rates among women with completed primary and
lower secondary education declined more slowly with a tendency to
level off. Fertility among women with the highest education seems
to have largely leveled off at rates well below replacement fertility.
Since these trends showed slightly different patterns for urban and
rural women, two separate models were developed. Both models
are based on fitting a spline through the data points that aligns the
trends over time for each education group with the cross-sectional
pattern of lower fertility by level of education, which tends to show
a rather clear general trend from high to low fertility levels. Since,
for the highest education group (university), both the cross-
sectional pattern as well as the trend over time show a minor in-
crease after reaching very low levels (a TFR of 1.73 for rural and
1.40 for urban, which are floor values), this light upswing is also
reflected in the fertility model that will eventually converge to a
level of 2.08 in urban and 1.75 in rural areas (see SI Appendix for
details). This is also in line with what the United Nations (UN)
assumes for long-term fertility assumptions of low-fertility coun-
tries (UN 2017 assessment) and can also be explained in terms of a
to-be-expected end of the tempo effect that depresses period fer-
tility due to postponement of childbearing (13). At the national
level these assumptions imply that fertility across all education
groups would reach a bottom of around 1.4 in 60 y for urban areas
and of around 1.73 in 80 y for rural areas. With different starting
values, all states will follow the rural- and urban-specific trajecto-
ries into the future (see SI Appendix for details).
Mortality. As for mortality, sex-specific life tables of each state
were taken separately for rural and urban areas from the SRS
website (14). These life tables were estimated based on registered
deaths during 2009–2013. Unfortunately, no education-specific life
tables were available, not even at the national level. The only
source of information for differential mortality is child mortality
by mother’s education as recorded in demographic surveys.
Therefore, using the Indian Demographic and Health Survey (15),
we calculated differential mortality by mother’s education and
used this to estimate adult mortality differentials using model life
tables. While this may result in a slight overestimation of mortality
differentials if child mortality is more sensitive to education than
adult mortality, it is still preferable to disregarding educational
differentials, which implicitly assumes a certainly incorrect zero
difference.
Fig. 6. Resulting total population sizes for India under constant scenario at
different levels of disaggregation.
Fig. 5. National-level TFR in India under constant scenario at different
levels of disaggregation.
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The SRS estimates for life expectancy at birth at the national
level were 69.3 y for women and 65.8 y for men for the period
around 2011. This sex difference in mortality in India is some-
what lower than in most other countries, and only since the 1980s
has the original pattern of higher female mortality been reversed.
Before then, India was one of the few countries where men lived
longer than women, presumably due to differential treatment. In
the coming decades we assume India will move toward the
standard international sex differentials in mortality.
For projecting life expectancy into the future, we generated an
average pathway for future gain by regressing gains in life ex-
pectancy between two observed points in time using time-series
data for several periods spanning 1970–2013 (SRS) separately
for males and females. This takes into account the fact that at
high levels of life expectancy potential gains tend to diminish.
We fit a simple linear regression and extrapolated life expectancy
into the future using the regression results to generate the gen-
eral predicted average gain. For men and women in each terri-
tory, we started with the recently observed average rate of
change and then let it converge to the general predicted average
gain by 2030. On average, this gain starts out to be somewhat
above 2 y per decade and carries on until the end of the century
at somewhat below 2 y per decade.
Migration. Internal migration between rural and urban regions
within and between the states is one of the main determinants of
regional population dynamics in India. The data for bilateral
flows between all of the rural and urban areas in all states were
not readily available and had to be estimated from different ta-
bles from the Census 2001 as the relevant data from the 2011
census has not yet published. A detailed account of this esti-
mation procedure and its results is given in SI Appendix.
Education. This study distinguishes between six levels of educa-
tional attainment ranging from illiterate to university. The given
educational attainment distributions for women and men in 2011
in each of the 70 urban and rural territories was used to re-
construct the distributions in earlier years by going back along
cohort lines. This utilizes the fact that educational attainment is
typically acquired at a younger age and then stays invariant over
the rest of life. Hence, if we know how many 60-y-old women are
high school graduates, we also know how many 30 y olds were
high school graduates 30 y ago. From this information, detailed
analysis of trends in educational attainment progression rates by
sex were produced for all urban and rural areas. The Indian
Education Trend scenario then assumes that these trends will
continue in the future, where only for tertiary education a ceiling
of 50% for rural and 70% for urban men and women is assumed.
Since recent progress in education in India has been very im-
pressive, the continuation will result in further rapid education
expansion. As a contrast, below we will also discuss the Constant
Enrollment Rates Scenario, which shows the implications of the
hypothetical case of no further education expansion.
A comparison of the different scenarios based on medium-
level assumptions for all of the components confirms the dif-
ferences between the models including alternative sources of
heterogeneity that had been identified for the constant scenario
above. But the differences in population size turn out to be
smaller than under the constant rates scenario due to smaller
differences in future fertility and mortality levels resulting from
assumptions of convergence. Over the next two to three de-
cades the results hardly differ because of the common effect of
Fig. 7. Resulting population size of India as a consequence of applying the
medium scenario assumptions to models accounting for different sources of
heterogeneity. CER, Constant Enrollment Rate; IET, Indian Education Trend.
Fig. 8. Education and age pyramids for India as projected to 2061 by the medium scenario combined with the education trend scenario (Left) and the
Constant Enrollment Rate Scenario (Right).
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population momentum and the only gradually increasing differ-
ences in rates, all hitting the 1.6 billion mark between 2036 and
2046 (Fig. 7). However, in terms of births the differences in the
trajectories start earlier with 2.3% in 2011–2016 between the
age-and-sex-only model and the age-sex-education model, in-
creasing to around 7% for the next 25 y.
After 2040 the paths in total population size diverge, with India’s
population peaking at quite different levels and at different points
in time. The red line in Fig. 7 gives the conventional national-level
projection in which only the age and sex structures are considered.
Here the population will peak at 1.71 billion in 2056–2066 and then
enter a slow decline. Fig. 7 also gives the medium variant of the
UN projections for India (thick broken line), which is based on an
age- and sex-only model but assumes slightly lower fertility than
our age- and sex-only model. This is why it results in somewhat
lower projections that after 2070 are almost identical with our
Indian education trend scenario. This also reminds us of the fact
that the heterogeneity effect discussed in this paper is only one
dimension of uncertainty while different assumptions on future
fertility levels may even have bigger impacts on the outcomes.
As expected, the lowest projection comes from the model that
considers only age, sex, and level of education, showing that the
population will peak at 1.66 billion. If only the states are being
considered and education is disregarded, the results peak at al-
most 1.8. The full model—considering all five dimensions—first
(dark blue line) produces a lower trajectory than the conven-
tional age-and-sex-only model (red line) due to a dominating
education effect, but at 2061 the two lines cross and it climbs
higher due to the state effect dominating. Finally, Fig. 7 also
shows the line for the full scenario in which medium fertility,
mortality, and migration assumptions are combined with the
assumption of constant school enrollment rates. Because of the
great momentum of changes in the educational composition by
cohort, this results in the highest population growth only toward
the end of the century. But, as Fig. 8 clearly shows, the two
different education scenarios show quite different education
distributions for the younger age groups in 2061. Since the In-
dian education expansion has not yet reached all parts of the
population, cessation of further expansions would result in a
sizable segment of the population with very low or no education.
Outlook and Conclusions
This study has provided insights with implications for the future of
India as well as for the future of producing population projections
around the world. We have shown how different degrees of ac-
counting for measurable heterogeneity within populations changes
the way in which we see the future. No universally valid recom-
mendation can be derived, and we suggest following Long’s (8)
pragmatic suggestion to include those dimensions that are in-
formative for the users and for which an empirical basis exists.
While age and sex are explicitly included by most producers of
population forecasts, we have concluded that education should also
be routinely included because it has well-established implications
for fertility and mortality (10, 16), all methods and data are readily
available, and the future educational attainment distributions are
of great interest in their own right as indicators of a country’s fu-
ture human capital and development potential (17, 18).
Since independence, India has seen tremendous expansion in its
population size, which has increased by a factor of 3.6 up to today.
In the past, only elites were educated, with the majority of the
population and in particular women never receiving any schooling.
Still, in 1990, 70% of adult women had never attended any school, a
proportion that subsequently has declined to 46% today. In par-
allel, the proportion of adult women with some tertiary education
increased from 3 to 7%. Hence, recent years have seen a rapid
improvement in education, and a look at younger cohorts shows
that India is set for further rapid expansion. Among women aged
15–19 today, only 14% are without formal schooling, and already
65% have completed junior secondary or higher levels. Given the
consistent evidence of the importance of broad-based education,
benefits ranging from poverty eradication and economic growth to
health and well-being to quality of institutions and even democracy
(18–22) suggest likely future improvements in human development.
But our analysis also shows that, if the education expansion should
stall in the near future, some of this potential benefit might be lost.
Where does this leave us with respect to comparison of the
world’s two billion-plus populations? Because China has massively
invested in universal education since the 1950s, it is about three to
four decades ahead of India in terms of human capital. Actually,
the education pyramid of India today looks similar to that of
China around 1980. And the one projection given here for India in
2050 looks similar to that of China today. While cultural and in-
stitutional factors may differ between the two countries, and there
can be no perfect analogy, this comparison makes it look likely
that India will experience similarly rapid human-capital–driven
development as China has over the past three to four decades.
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